Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Western Hopei Operation
The Western Hopei Operation was one of the engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Three Infantry, one Cavalry and an artillery Regiment of the crossed to the south bank of the Yangtze River near Ichang to attack the Chinese positions there.
Underground Project 131
Underground Project 131 is a system of tunnels in 's Hubei province constructed in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to accommodate the command headquarters in case of a nuclear war. The facility was never fully completed or used, and is currently open to visitors as a tourist attraction.
The Project 131 site is located in the Gaoqiao Township of the Xian'an District of the Xianning prefecture-level city in Hubei Province.
It is about 15 km east of Xianning urban area, and 80 km south of central Wuhan.
With the increase of tensions in the late 1960s, the Chinese leaders deemed it prudent to construct a number of underground facilities to protect the country's population, military, as well as its command and control bodies, in case of a nuclear conflict. The best known of these facilities is Beijing's .
On January 31, 1969, a decision was made to construct an underground command headquarters for the country's military; the codename "131" for the project stems from this date . The PLA Chief of Staff, General Huang Yongsheng himself was in charge of the construction.
In 1981, the Project 131 site was turned over to the civilian authorities of the prefecture-level city of Xianning, where it is located. An upscale hotel and conference facility was created above the ground, while the tunnel system was turned into a tourist attraction. At present , the underground rooms were mostly bare, decorated with signs describing the purported use of each room, an occasional piece of period furniture, and a few maps dealing with China's military history. There are also some exhibits in the pavilions on the surface.
Huang Yongsheng's grave is also on the site.
Location
The Project 131 site is located in the Gaoqiao Township of the Xian'an District of the Xianning prefecture-level city in Hubei Province.
It is about 15 km east of Xianning urban area, and 80 km south of central Wuhan.
History
With the increase of tensions in the late 1960s, the Chinese leaders deemed it prudent to construct a number of underground facilities to protect the country's population, military, as well as its command and control bodies, in case of a nuclear conflict. The best known of these facilities is Beijing's .
On January 31, 1969, a decision was made to construct an underground command headquarters for the country's military; the codename "131" for the project stems from this date . The PLA Chief of Staff, General Huang Yongsheng himself was in charge of the construction.
Present state
In 1981, the Project 131 site was turned over to the civilian authorities of the prefecture-level city of Xianning, where it is located. An upscale hotel and conference facility was created above the ground, while the tunnel system was turned into a tourist attraction. At present , the underground rooms were mostly bare, decorated with signs describing the purported use of each room, an occasional piece of period furniture, and a few maps dealing with China's military history. There are also some exhibits in the pavilions on the surface.
Huang Yongsheng's grave is also on the site.
Jing Shan-Zhongxiang Campaign
Jing Shan – Zhongxiang Campaign was half a year long struggle in Hubei between the s and the communists for the control of Jing Shan and Zhongxiang regions during the Chinese Civil War and resulted in communist victory.
In the second half of 1947, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian decided to reestablish Jianghan Military Region by combining the communist 5th from southern Shaanxi and the communist force in western Hubei in the Dabie Mountains, and Zhao Jimei was named as the first commander. On December 14, 1947, under the new commander Zhang Caiqian , the communist force crossed the Beijing – Hankou railroad to strengthen their positions, and on December 20, 1947, the 1st Regiment of the communist Independent Brigade launched its assault on Jing Shan. Faced with overwhelming enemy force, the security battalion guarding the city was forced to retreat without a fight, but in the haste of retreat, the s failed to destroy abundant provisions stocked in the city, and thus provided the enemy with great resources, which proved to be fatal for the s in the subsequent battles in the region.
At 3:00 AM on December 22, 1947, the communists concentrated their forces by gathering three regiments to start their march toward Zhongxiang. The force was scattered to defend other isolated positions and thus was not able to regroup and reinforce the Zhongxiang which was defended by a single regiment. After an hour of fierce battle, all of the positions in the outskirt of the city fell and being cutoff by the attack enemy, the surviving defenders of these positions were forced to retreat to other directions instead of back into the city.
After witness the annihilation of the defenders outside the city wall, the defenders inside the city wall attempted to via the south gate, but they were beaten back into the city. At 4:00 PM, the final assault on the city begun under the cover of shelling of the positions from several dozen artillery pieces and machine gun fire from over 90 machine guns. The defenders were completely suppressed and the attacking enemy was able to breach the city wall at places of White Tiger Hall and Fuying Hall . The enemy assault team was able to subsequently breach the defense at the Great East Gate of the city wall, enabling the main force of the attacking enemy to enter the city via the gap. After several hours of brave and desperate but futile street fighting put up by the s, the defenders were completely wiped out by the enemy before dusk. The communists gathered 367 cadavers of the defenders in the battle to take Zhongxiang.
After the battle, the communists abandoned the city on December 25, 1947 according to the plan, and retreated to countryside with abundant provisions captured. The s returned to the empty city on {December 29, 1947, but the city was looted clean by the enemy, thus severely limiting the capabilities for any future operations. In contrary, the communists used the abundant supplies captured to boost their strength and solidify their gains in the rural regions surrounding the city, and it was only a matter of time before they retake the city. The s forced on the defensive were incapable of stopping the enemy and in June, 1948, Zhongxiang fell for the second time, and this time for good, with the s being permanently driven out.
The communist victory rooted in the correct strategy of controlling the rural regions surrounding the cities first, and then to take the cities with isolated enemy garrisons. The s, in contrary, managed to avoid heavy loss in the initial stage by not engaging the overwhelmingly strong enemy, but in doing so, allowed the enemy to loot important provisions in great quantity when they failed to destroy any provisions in retreats. As a result, the numerically superior force was not able to sustain themselves for any prolonged operations outside the city walls due to insufficient supply, and was thus gradually reduced in numbers in many small but consecutive engagements as the well supplied enemy attacked.
In the second half of 1947, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian decided to reestablish Jianghan Military Region by combining the communist 5th from southern Shaanxi and the communist force in western Hubei in the Dabie Mountains, and Zhao Jimei was named as the first commander. On December 14, 1947, under the new commander Zhang Caiqian , the communist force crossed the Beijing – Hankou railroad to strengthen their positions, and on December 20, 1947, the 1st Regiment of the communist Independent Brigade launched its assault on Jing Shan. Faced with overwhelming enemy force, the security battalion guarding the city was forced to retreat without a fight, but in the haste of retreat, the s failed to destroy abundant provisions stocked in the city, and thus provided the enemy with great resources, which proved to be fatal for the s in the subsequent battles in the region.
At 3:00 AM on December 22, 1947, the communists concentrated their forces by gathering three regiments to start their march toward Zhongxiang. The force was scattered to defend other isolated positions and thus was not able to regroup and reinforce the Zhongxiang which was defended by a single regiment. After an hour of fierce battle, all of the positions in the outskirt of the city fell and being cutoff by the attack enemy, the surviving defenders of these positions were forced to retreat to other directions instead of back into the city.
After witness the annihilation of the defenders outside the city wall, the defenders inside the city wall attempted to via the south gate, but they were beaten back into the city. At 4:00 PM, the final assault on the city begun under the cover of shelling of the positions from several dozen artillery pieces and machine gun fire from over 90 machine guns. The defenders were completely suppressed and the attacking enemy was able to breach the city wall at places of White Tiger Hall and Fuying Hall . The enemy assault team was able to subsequently breach the defense at the Great East Gate of the city wall, enabling the main force of the attacking enemy to enter the city via the gap. After several hours of brave and desperate but futile street fighting put up by the s, the defenders were completely wiped out by the enemy before dusk. The communists gathered 367 cadavers of the defenders in the battle to take Zhongxiang.
After the battle, the communists abandoned the city on December 25, 1947 according to the plan, and retreated to countryside with abundant provisions captured. The s returned to the empty city on {December 29, 1947, but the city was looted clean by the enemy, thus severely limiting the capabilities for any future operations. In contrary, the communists used the abundant supplies captured to boost their strength and solidify their gains in the rural regions surrounding the city, and it was only a matter of time before they retake the city. The s forced on the defensive were incapable of stopping the enemy and in June, 1948, Zhongxiang fell for the second time, and this time for good, with the s being permanently driven out.
The communist victory rooted in the correct strategy of controlling the rural regions surrounding the cities first, and then to take the cities with isolated enemy garrisons. The s, in contrary, managed to avoid heavy loss in the initial stage by not engaging the overwhelmingly strong enemy, but in doing so, allowed the enemy to loot important provisions in great quantity when they failed to destroy any provisions in retreats. As a result, the numerically superior force was not able to sustain themselves for any prolonged operations outside the city walls due to insufficient supply, and was thus gradually reduced in numbers in many small but consecutive engagements as the well supplied enemy attacked.
Jiangxia
Jiangxia may refer to:
An ancient Commandery in Hubei, China .
The modern Jiangxia District in the southern part of the City of Wuhan.
An ancient Commandery in Hubei, China .
The modern Jiangxia District in the southern part of the City of Wuhan.
Hubei Pocket
Hubei Pocket was a that took place in late July and early December 1864, after the end of Taiping Rebellion, in the Hubei of China. It was, for all intents and purposes, the final dagger in Taiping Rebellion's war effort, as more than 200,000 troops were taken prisoner, but remained 19,000 Taiping troops led by Lai Wenkwok broke out and step into southern Henan and combined Nien Rebellion 150,000 together, and prepare raised offensive to Empress Dowager Cixi in Beijing.
Chen Yucheng
Background
From 1854,Western Army of Taipings first commander was Wei June, Second was famous Chen Yucheng, Third was Chen Decai.
The battle
Reinforcement Nanjing but fail
Hong Xiuquan orderd the Western Army of Taipings save capital Nanjing quickly, but too late because forward and back full too much Qing army and cut off them between, Xiang Army occupied Nanjing in 19 July 1864 and finished 14 years Taiping Rebellion, then Western Army of Taipings commander was Chen Decai, vice commander was Lai Wenkwok.
Commander suicide
Chen command 200,000 soldiers, through 3 months dog fight, but over 130,000 soldiers led by general Ma Zongher surrender to Qing government. It forced Chen suicide in Huoshan County‘s mountains and general Lan was arrested in early November 1864. And announced Western Army of Taipings raised from occupied Wuhan on December 1852, fault 1 month just 12 years whole were step in history.
Historians guessed general Ma Zongher surrender by Wei June lobby.
Broke out
Another, Lai Wenkwok and general Liang Chengfu commanded less 100,000 Taiping wins some battles in northern Hubei. General Fan Ruzeng escaped from fallen Nanjing and led 4,000 remains join in them in middle September. Even 4,000 remains enough encouraged them excited. 3 they led 23,000 remains decided Broke out toward north and successed on november.
In december 1864, they allied northern Chinese religions, They choiced Lai Wenkwok lead them and Lai organized and military them, appointed every troop commanders named king of Taiping‘s, great Nien Rebellion raised！
Encirclement Campaign against Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet
The against Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet was a campaign launched by the Chinese Nationalist Government that was intended to destroy Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet and its Chinese Red Army in the local region. It was responded by the Communists’ Counter- at Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet , also called by the communists as the Counter- at Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base , in which the local Chinese Red Army successfully defended their soviet republic in the southern Jiangxi province against the attacks from December, 1930 to May, 1931.
The communist 16th Army of the Chinese Red Army stationed at the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet launched a preemptive strike against the nationalist forces and succeeded in annihilating an entire nationalist regiment in Tong City in December, 1930 just before the nationalists launched their own attack on their communist enemy at the beginning of the campaign. As a result, nationalists had to withdraw temporarily to regroup, and wait for reinforcement. As the nationalists deployed more troops from other regions to Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet for the preparation to avenge their initial defeat, they had left other regions dangerously vulnerable to enemy attacks. Pounced on the opportunity, the communist forces of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet decided to help their comrades in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet by striking the nationalists in two fronts: western Hunan and southeastern Hunan.
The communist offensives in western and southeastern Hunan were successful and in addition to obtaining more land, weaponry, money and supplies, the communist force of Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet also successfully linked up with the 7th Army of the Chinese Red Army at the border of Hunan and Guangdong. Nationalists were forced to redeploy their troops to face these newer threats that were much more urgent, and as a result, the planned offensives against communists at the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet had to be called off as troops were withdrawn for new assignments. Communists, however, would not let their adversary leave in peace, and the 16th Army of the Chinese Red Army launched another round of assaults on the retreating nationalists, annihilating eleven companies in the process. After the victory, the 16th Army of the Chinese Red Army was joined by the Independent 3rd Division of the Chinese Red Army, and succeeded in annihilating two more nationalist regiments.
The communist Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet was a communist base to the west of Jiangxi Soviet, the most important communist base prior to Long March. In comparison to other Soviet Republics, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet was relatively small, and it was a collection of communist bases linked together by regions with strong communist guerrilla activities. After suffering defeats in their against Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet, the nationalists decided it was not worth the energy and resources to continue the effort, which should be concentrated on against major communist bases such as other communist Soviet Republics with much larger size, because as larger communist bases were eliminated, the smaller ones would not last for very long afterward either. As a result, the nationalists called off their against Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet, and the communists subsequently declared victory and continued to expand and consolidate their Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet.
The communist 16th Army of the Chinese Red Army stationed at the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet launched a preemptive strike against the nationalist forces and succeeded in annihilating an entire nationalist regiment in Tong City in December, 1930 just before the nationalists launched their own attack on their communist enemy at the beginning of the campaign. As a result, nationalists had to withdraw temporarily to regroup, and wait for reinforcement. As the nationalists deployed more troops from other regions to Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet for the preparation to avenge their initial defeat, they had left other regions dangerously vulnerable to enemy attacks. Pounced on the opportunity, the communist forces of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet decided to help their comrades in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet by striking the nationalists in two fronts: western Hunan and southeastern Hunan.
The communist offensives in western and southeastern Hunan were successful and in addition to obtaining more land, weaponry, money and supplies, the communist force of Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet also successfully linked up with the 7th Army of the Chinese Red Army at the border of Hunan and Guangdong. Nationalists were forced to redeploy their troops to face these newer threats that were much more urgent, and as a result, the planned offensives against communists at the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet had to be called off as troops were withdrawn for new assignments. Communists, however, would not let their adversary leave in peace, and the 16th Army of the Chinese Red Army launched another round of assaults on the retreating nationalists, annihilating eleven companies in the process. After the victory, the 16th Army of the Chinese Red Army was joined by the Independent 3rd Division of the Chinese Red Army, and succeeded in annihilating two more nationalist regiments.
The communist Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet was a communist base to the west of Jiangxi Soviet, the most important communist base prior to Long March. In comparison to other Soviet Republics, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet was relatively small, and it was a collection of communist bases linked together by regions with strong communist guerrilla activities. After suffering defeats in their against Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet, the nationalists decided it was not worth the energy and resources to continue the effort, which should be concentrated on against major communist bases such as other communist Soviet Republics with much larger size, because as larger communist bases were eliminated, the smaller ones would not last for very long afterward either. As a result, the nationalists called off their against Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet, and the communists subsequently declared victory and continued to expand and consolidate their Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet.
Central Hupei Operation
The Central Hupei Operation was one of the engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Known as the Central Hupei Operation, East and West of Hsiang River, in Japan it is called the 漢水作戦 . The battle lasted from November 25th to 30th, 1940.
After the battle of in the summer of 1940, the Japanese controlled and . The Chinese controlled the area east and west of the . Their lines extended from the southwest of Yuan-an via , north of , and the foothills of Ta-hung Shan, to the area northwest of astride both banks of the Hsiang River. The Wu-tang Mountains were on the right and the Tung-po Mountains on the left. In coordination with the guerilla forces in the southeast, the Chinese repeatedly struck at the Japanese forces that had penetrated to I-chang. As a result the Chinese believed that the Japanese forces at and found their flanks exposed and in a difficult position. To relieve themselves of this threat they launched an offensive against the Chinese forces in late November. Japanese sources say the purpose was to probe to find the location of the Army of Tang Enbo. If that was their purpose they were to be disappointed.
During early November the Japanese made preparations for their attack, repairing and constructing roads, bridges, defense works and airfields. Rations, ammunition, metal and rubber boats, were stored in the vicinity of . They also brought in additional troops into the area west of the Xiang River, estimated at five regiments bringing their strength to the equivalent of three Divisions. To the east at the Japanese increased their strength to a full division at along the Hsiang - Hua highway. They further brought in supporting units of tanks and artillery in these areas.
On November 23rd the Japanese 11th Army preparations were complete and their unit deployed in their attack positions in five major forces:
Kayashima Force at composed of the and elements of the under Lt. Gen Taka Kayashima commander of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade.
Murakami Force, at [ ] , the under its commander Lt. Gen Keisaku Murakami.
Hirabayashi Force, at , composed of a portion of the 17th Division and Kurahashi Detachment under the commander of 17th Division, Lt-General Morito Hirabayashi.
Kitano Force north of Ching-shan in the vicinity of modern Shuanghe , composed of a potion of the and the Kususe Armored force under Lt. Gen Kenzo Kitano commander of the 4th Division.
Teshima Force at composed of the under its commander Lt. General Fusataro Teshima.
Li Zongren recognizing the Japanese build up foretold an attack, had his 5th War Area alerted. He ordered the River West Army Army Group , Right Army Group and Central Army Group to checking the coming Japanese advance by counterattacks on the flanks of their advancing columns when the opportunity presented itself.
On the morning of November 25, the Japanese began their attack in several columns.
On the Western Front between the Hsiang River and Tang-yang, over 1,000 Japanese from the Kayashima Force, advanced northward from Tang-yang toward Hengtien, and broke through the gap between the positions of the 179th and 37th Divisions of the Chinese 77th Corps at Yang-chi-ai.
Over 3,000 Japanese from Murakami Force from broke through the positions of the 27th Division of the Chinese 30th Corps toward Yen-chih-miao .
Meanwhile the Japanese Kitano Force moving northwest from Chu-chia-fu to Tung-lin-ling and divided into several columns to drive north deep into the Chinese position at Liang-shui-ching, Hsia-chia-tzu, and northeast toward Kuai-huo-pu. At night, the River West Army Group swung reseves into blocking positions from Heng-tien to Yen-chih-miao and Kuai-huo-pu.
On November 26, the Murakami Force reached Hsien-chu. On November 27th the Murakami Force attacked Liu-hou-chi and the two columns of Kitano Force attacked Li-chia-tang, both fighting bitterly for a day against the Chinese 30th Corps reserve, the 30th Division under Liu Chen-shan, who halted their advance. At dusk the Chinese 30th Corps launched a counterattack in force with elements of the 31st and 27th Divisions striking the Japanese rear areas. Unable to withstand this attack the Japanese retreated toward Ching-men and Chung-hsiang, with the Chinese in pursuit.
Meanwhile east of the Hsiang River on the Ching-Chung Highway Front the Japanese Hirabayashi Force massed more than 3,000 men in an attack on Changshoudien and Wang-chia-tien attempting to encircle the - Wu-lung-kuan line. On November 26th, the Japanese reinforced to 5,000 men, advanced a force east to , while the main force attacked Pien-chai, Wang-chia-ho and Yu-nan-men. Heavy fighting lasted until darkness ended the clash in a stalemate. On November 27th the Chinese 44th Corps counterattacked from Wang-chia-ho. Its converging attack with the main force of the 67th Corps towards the northwest, caused heavy casualties to the Japanese.
On November 25th the Japanese Teshima Force on the Sui Hsien Front launched a violent attack with a column of 2,000men from Liang-chui-kou on the Chinese 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns of more than 1000 men each advanced west toward Ho-yuan-tien and Ching-ming-pu. By darkness, the Japanese reinforced. On November 26th the Japanese fought a bitter battle with the Chinese 124th and 127th Divisions at Chin-chi Shan and Ching-ming-pu. Another Japanese force of 700-800 men moved from Hsi-ho via Lang-ho-tien to Tang-chia-fan. Having been attacked by the 41st Corps, the Japanese in the vicinity of Ching-ming-pu linked up with their force at Chin-chi Shan and moved to the vicinity of Ho-yuantien on November 27th. At night, the Japanese force near Tang-chia-fan reached the vicinity of Huan-tan Chen to confront the Chinese 125th Division.
Since its objective was to break the Japanese force 5th War Area command directed its forces to keep secure key localities and take advantage of mountainous terrain to conduct ambushes to stop the invaders. Heavy fighting lasted until the 28th of November when the Japanese retreated. Chinese forces west of the Hsiang River continued their pursuit. The Japanese force in front of the Chinese Right Army Group was routed on the same day, retreating by several routes. Subjected to a converging attack by Chinese forces of the Central Army Group, the Japanese forces facing them in the area of Ho-yuan-tien, and Huan-tan Chen, fell back to high ground in the vicinity of Ho-yuan-tien and Tang-chia-fan and were encircled by the Chinese. The Japanese pulled a further 1,500-1600 infantry and cavalry from Sui Hsien and Yingshan via Shang-shih-tien and Sha-tien for a turning movement against the Chinese to retrieve the situation. Once again, the Japanese were ambushed. Under cover of airplanes and armour, the Japanese retreated toward Sui Hsien and Hsi-ho, as Chinese forces attacked along the line from Chun-chuan to Anchu, Li-shan, and Kao-cheng. On November 30th, the Chinese Army Groups recovered their original positions.
The Japanese operation resulted in the death of over 5,000 and the wounding of 7.000 -8,000 Japanese, over 1,000 bodies being left in the field according to Chinese sources. The Japanese had hoped to have a victory at the time of the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime so as to dampen Chinese morale. The effect was the opposite of what was hoped.
Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung, Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
Pg. 339-342.
Map 22.
Map and order of battle discussion and narative.
After the battle of in the summer of 1940, the Japanese controlled and . The Chinese controlled the area east and west of the . Their lines extended from the southwest of Yuan-an via , north of , and the foothills of Ta-hung Shan, to the area northwest of astride both banks of the Hsiang River. The Wu-tang Mountains were on the right and the Tung-po Mountains on the left. In coordination with the guerilla forces in the southeast, the Chinese repeatedly struck at the Japanese forces that had penetrated to I-chang. As a result the Chinese believed that the Japanese forces at and found their flanks exposed and in a difficult position. To relieve themselves of this threat they launched an offensive against the Chinese forces in late November. Japanese sources say the purpose was to probe to find the location of the Army of Tang Enbo. If that was their purpose they were to be disappointed.
Preparations
During early November the Japanese made preparations for their attack, repairing and constructing roads, bridges, defense works and airfields. Rations, ammunition, metal and rubber boats, were stored in the vicinity of . They also brought in additional troops into the area west of the Xiang River, estimated at five regiments bringing their strength to the equivalent of three Divisions. To the east at the Japanese increased their strength to a full division at along the Hsiang - Hua highway. They further brought in supporting units of tanks and artillery in these areas.
On November 23rd the Japanese 11th Army preparations were complete and their unit deployed in their attack positions in five major forces:
Kayashima Force at composed of the and elements of the under Lt. Gen Taka Kayashima commander of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade.
Murakami Force, at [ ] , the under its commander Lt. Gen Keisaku Murakami.
Hirabayashi Force, at , composed of a portion of the 17th Division and Kurahashi Detachment under the commander of 17th Division, Lt-General Morito Hirabayashi.
Kitano Force north of Ching-shan in the vicinity of modern Shuanghe , composed of a potion of the and the Kususe Armored force under Lt. Gen Kenzo Kitano commander of the 4th Division.
Teshima Force at composed of the under its commander Lt. General Fusataro Teshima.
Li Zongren recognizing the Japanese build up foretold an attack, had his 5th War Area alerted. He ordered the River West Army Army Group , Right Army Group and Central Army Group to checking the coming Japanese advance by counterattacks on the flanks of their advancing columns when the opportunity presented itself.
Order of Battle Central Hupei Operation
The Offensive
On the morning of November 25, the Japanese began their attack in several columns.
On the Western Front between the Hsiang River and Tang-yang, over 1,000 Japanese from the Kayashima Force, advanced northward from Tang-yang toward Hengtien, and broke through the gap between the positions of the 179th and 37th Divisions of the Chinese 77th Corps at Yang-chi-ai.
Over 3,000 Japanese from Murakami Force from broke through the positions of the 27th Division of the Chinese 30th Corps toward Yen-chih-miao .
Meanwhile the Japanese Kitano Force moving northwest from Chu-chia-fu to Tung-lin-ling and divided into several columns to drive north deep into the Chinese position at Liang-shui-ching, Hsia-chia-tzu, and northeast toward Kuai-huo-pu. At night, the River West Army Group swung reseves into blocking positions from Heng-tien to Yen-chih-miao and Kuai-huo-pu.
On November 26, the Murakami Force reached Hsien-chu. On November 27th the Murakami Force attacked Liu-hou-chi and the two columns of Kitano Force attacked Li-chia-tang, both fighting bitterly for a day against the Chinese 30th Corps reserve, the 30th Division under Liu Chen-shan, who halted their advance. At dusk the Chinese 30th Corps launched a counterattack in force with elements of the 31st and 27th Divisions striking the Japanese rear areas. Unable to withstand this attack the Japanese retreated toward Ching-men and Chung-hsiang, with the Chinese in pursuit.
Meanwhile east of the Hsiang River on the Ching-Chung Highway Front the Japanese Hirabayashi Force massed more than 3,000 men in an attack on Changshoudien and Wang-chia-tien attempting to encircle the - Wu-lung-kuan line. On November 26th, the Japanese reinforced to 5,000 men, advanced a force east to , while the main force attacked Pien-chai, Wang-chia-ho and Yu-nan-men. Heavy fighting lasted until darkness ended the clash in a stalemate. On November 27th the Chinese 44th Corps counterattacked from Wang-chia-ho. Its converging attack with the main force of the 67th Corps towards the northwest, caused heavy casualties to the Japanese.
On November 25th the Japanese Teshima Force on the Sui Hsien Front launched a violent attack with a column of 2,000men from Liang-chui-kou on the Chinese 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns of more than 1000 men each advanced west toward Ho-yuan-tien and Ching-ming-pu. By darkness, the Japanese reinforced. On November 26th the Japanese fought a bitter battle with the Chinese 124th and 127th Divisions at Chin-chi Shan and Ching-ming-pu. Another Japanese force of 700-800 men moved from Hsi-ho via Lang-ho-tien to Tang-chia-fan. Having been attacked by the 41st Corps, the Japanese in the vicinity of Ching-ming-pu linked up with their force at Chin-chi Shan and moved to the vicinity of Ho-yuantien on November 27th. At night, the Japanese force near Tang-chia-fan reached the vicinity of Huan-tan Chen to confront the Chinese 125th Division.
Since its objective was to break the Japanese force 5th War Area command directed its forces to keep secure key localities and take advantage of mountainous terrain to conduct ambushes to stop the invaders. Heavy fighting lasted until the 28th of November when the Japanese retreated. Chinese forces west of the Hsiang River continued their pursuit. The Japanese force in front of the Chinese Right Army Group was routed on the same day, retreating by several routes. Subjected to a converging attack by Chinese forces of the Central Army Group, the Japanese forces facing them in the area of Ho-yuan-tien, and Huan-tan Chen, fell back to high ground in the vicinity of Ho-yuan-tien and Tang-chia-fan and were encircled by the Chinese. The Japanese pulled a further 1,500-1600 infantry and cavalry from Sui Hsien and Yingshan via Shang-shih-tien and Sha-tien for a turning movement against the Chinese to retrieve the situation. Once again, the Japanese were ambushed. Under cover of airplanes and armour, the Japanese retreated toward Sui Hsien and Hsi-ho, as Chinese forces attacked along the line from Chun-chuan to Anchu, Li-shan, and Kao-cheng. On November 30th, the Chinese Army Groups recovered their original positions.
Results
The Japanese operation resulted in the death of over 5,000 and the wounding of 7.000 -8,000 Japanese, over 1,000 bodies being left in the field according to Chinese sources. The Japanese had hoped to have a victory at the time of the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime so as to dampen Chinese morale. The effect was the opposite of what was hoped.
Sources:
Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung, Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
Pg. 339-342.
Map 22.
Map and order of battle discussion and narative.
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